Tuesday, November 10, 2026
Third Opinion

The dead argue about the news. You pick your side.

Lula Wins Brazil Presidential Election After Second Round Victory

Brazil’s Election Is Not a Revolution — It Is a Test of a Trust

Lula’s dramatic victory in Brazil does not reset the terms of political power; it renews, under sharper scrutiny, the old question whether rulers will use their trust to protect lives, liberties, and estates, or to prey upon them.


That an election can be described as “sensational” already tells us something about the condition of a commonwealth. In Brazil, I am told, an incumbent president first lost a round of voting to a far‑right rival, only to triumph “spectacularly” in the second. Passions plainly ran high; the contest was framed in terms of corruption and violence; citizens and observers still press correspondents with anxious questions. Yet beneath this theatre, one sober question remains: what has really changed in the tenure of political power? An election, even a dramatic one, is not magic. It either confirms that authority is held on trust from the people, or it reveals that something else is moving the wires.

When I sought, in my Second Treatise of Government, to understand political power right, I defined it as a right of making laws with penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, by which I meant the lives, liberties, and estates of the people, all for the public good. That definition is not a compliment we pay to a government; it is a rule by which we judge whether what calls itself government is indeed such, or only force. An election, therefore, is not merely the counting of voices, but the manner by which a free and equal people indicate who shall exercise that limited right on their behalf. If Brazilians, after open debate, peaceably delivered up this trust to a new chief magistrate, then so far we see civil, not natural, power at work.

But the bare fact of a vote tells us less than many suppose. Men are, by nature, free, equal, and independent; no one is born with a saddle on his back, nor another booted and spurred to ride him. Any claim to rule must therefore carry its own justification, and the burden of proof lies on power, not on liberty. A majority decision is one form by which a community settles who shall speak as its legislative or executive; yet that decision cannot make it just to invade the innocent, to plunder estates, or to visit death on subjects as a matter of policy. A people may consent to be governed; they cannot, without contradicting the law of their own being, be taken to consent to their own destruction.

The Brazilian contest, I learn, turned heavily on corruption and violence. Here the law of nature – which is only reason consulting the equality and dependence of men as the workmanship of one Maker – speaks plainly. No one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. A ruler who converts his office into an engine of private gain, or who tolerates a known traffic of bribes and favours, does not merely sin against a human statute; he breaks the very condition upon which political power is held. Likewise, those who answer armed violence with a standing rule to “shoot first” assume a power over life that no man had in the state of nature, and therefore could never rightly transfer.

I am told of massacres in Rio de Janeiro, of an approach to public security that has not lessened violence but, in many eyes, made it worse. I am also told that one side of the quarrel accuses “soft” policies, and that others reply that public security lies chiefly with state governments, not the federal head. Here I confess ignorance of your particular constitutions, yet the principle abides: wherever the sword of the commonwealth is lodged, it is to protect, not to terrify, the innocent. Prerogative – that is, a power in the executive to act for the public good without, or even against, the letter of the law in sudden emergencies – may sometimes be necessary; but when it hardens into a standing license to kill without due process, it ceases to be prerogative and becomes arbitrary power.

Still, I would mislead if I said that every abuse dissolves the government, or that each instance of corruption or police violence warrants resistance. In the Second Treatise I argued that men bear much; they are not forward to change their old forms. It is only a long train of abuses, all tending the same way, that makes evident a design upon their liberties and reduces them to the necessity of an appeal to heaven. An election like Brazil’s, where an incumbent can be defeated after a first‑round loss and yet lawfully prevail in a second, shows rather that the society can change governors without dissolving itself. This is a mark of health, not of perfection, and it imposes a sharper obligation on the victor.

For the meaning of this “sensational” result, then, is neither simple vindication nor apocalypse. It is a renewal of trust on trial. If those now entrusted with the executive labour to curb corruption, to subject force to known laws and impartial judges, and to ensure that public security measures guard rather than prey upon the poorest in Rio and elsewhere, they will answer the only question that matters: whether their power could have been consented to by free and equal men for the protection of their property in the broad sense. If, instead, corruption is excused because “our side” prevails, or violence is applauded so long as it is visited on despised neighbours, the form of consent will remain while the substance of government quietly decays.

I do not yet know whether Brazil’s new administration will discharge its trust or betray it; on that future performance, not on the drama of the ballot, its true legitimacy will depend.

From the works cited

  • Second Treatise of Government — Political power defined narrowly as the right to make laws, with penalties, only for the public good — anything beyond that definition must justify itself or stand condemned.
  • Second Treatise of Government — Government by consent and majority decision, with the legislative supreme but itself bound: a fiduciary power, held on trust, forfeited by breach.