Trump Administration Flags Over 400 Potentially Ineligible Voters in Washington State
Election Power Held on Trust, Not Suspicion
When federal officers bid a state set aside citizens’ ballots on their word alone, they do not guard elections; they lay claim to an arbitrary power no free people can prudently endure.
I read that federal officials have written to the chief election officer of Washington state, naming more than four hundred persons whose ballots, they say, ought to be set aside because they may be noncitizens, and that state and local officers now plan how to face possible raids, misbehavior by federal monitors, and even attempts to seize votes or machines. Here is power arriving not as a known rule beforehand, but as a threatening presence round the very act by which a people chooses its rulers. When those charged to conduct an election must rehearse how to withstand their own government, something in the trust that makes government possible has already been shaken.
In my Second Treatise of Government, when I defined political power, I limited it to the making and enforcing of laws for the public good, by consent, and for no other end but the preservation of the people’s property in the large sense—their lives, liberties, and estates. The right to vote, whereby a man has a share in choosing the legislative that will bind him, belongs to that property; it is one chief instrument by which he preserves all the rest. Whoever touches this power, whether under color of fraud-hunting or any other fair name, must remember that he handles what the people never meant to give up into any hands but such as act by clear law and with an impartial judge.
The federal officers say that hundreds of these voters may be noncitizens, and that some number of ballots already cast should therefore be set aside. Perhaps it is so; I do not here deny the possibility that error or deceit has crept into the rolls. But in such a case the burden of proof, by all rules of reason and by the very nature of free government, lies upon the magistrate who restrains, not upon the subject who exercises his civil right. As I argued in my Essay Concerning Human Understanding, assent ought to be proportioned to the evidence; to believe strongly on a weak proof is not a virtue, but a failure of our duty to the understanding. Much more, then, to punish strongly—by cancelling a man’s vote—on a weak proof is a failure of political duty.
If there be a standing law in that state, plainly known beforehand, that prescribes who may vote, how citizenship is to be shown, and by what regular process a doubtful case is to be tried before an impartial tribunal, then the executive, whether of the state or of the union, may certainly aid in bringing information under that rule. In such a course it is a minister of the law, not a rival to it. But where, instead of walking in that open path, officers arrive with letters bidding local servants of the people set aside ballots on the executive’s own say‑so, and where men must fear unannounced raids or the seizure of machines by those who answer only to that same executive, there the power begins to look like one that makes itself judge in its own case.
Some will say that the danger of unlawful votes is so great that we must bear with rough methods, and that better a few lawful ballots cast aside than a single unlawful one admitted. This sounds plausible until one asks by what right the state, which exists only by the consent of those who are naturally free, presumes to treat their franchise as a trifle. It is one thing if, after full hearing, clear evidence, and the sentence of an impartial judge, a particular man is found not entitled to vote; then his exclusion is no wrong to him or to the rest. It is quite another to proceed by general suspicion, to cast a cloud over hundreds at once, and to surround the poll with officers of force, as if the citizen came to the ballot not as the principal in whose name government acts, but as a suspect who must justify himself.
I have elsewhere urged that the magistrate’s care extends only to civil interests, not to the inward persuasion of the mind. Yet men do not fear that these federal monitors and immigration officers will correct their metaphysical errors; they fear that their political choices will draw upon them visitations of force. When Election Day is planned under the shadow of “how to react” if national officers misbehave, or if they lay hands on votes and machines, the people may well conclude that their governors are no longer content to win their assent by argument and law, but will overawe them by their mere presence. That is a step toward ruling opinion by fear, which is as improper to a civil magistrate as ruling belief by fire and sword.
What then is to be done? I do not say that every overreach, every hasty letter from a distant office, every ill‑conducted monitor, dissolves a government or justifies an appeal to heaven. The dissolution of government comes, as I there wrote, only after a long train of abuses, tending all the same way, that make it plain to sober men that the trust is broken and cannot be repaired. In the meantime, the people and their state officers are bound to insist that any interference with their elections be grounded in public, standing law; that evidence be produced and tested in ordinary courts; and that no ballot or machine be seized except under such forms. If such demands are steadily resisted, and fear becomes the common condition of voting, then the people will not be the first to have rebelled; their rulers will have rebelled against the very trust that gave them power.
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From the works cited
- Second Treatise of Government — Political power defined narrowly as the right to make laws, with penalties, only for the public good — anything beyond that definition must justify itself or stand condemned.
- Second Treatise of Government — Government by consent and majority decision, with the legislative supreme but itself bound: a fiduciary power, held on trust, forfeited by breach.
- An Essay Concerning Human Understanding — Assent must be proportioned to the evidence; believing beyond one's proofs is a failure of duty, not a mark of faith.
