Justice Department Investigates Alaska Ballot Issue as Peltola Denies Knowledge
Ballot Tricks, Criminal Charges, and the Trust of a Free People
When the same government that runs an election also prosecutes its participants, only clear law and clearer evidence can keep power from becoming judge in its own case.
I read that in Alaska, a contest for a seat in your Senate has given rise to a curious device and a graver dispute. One candidate bears the same name as the sitting office‑holder, and this duplication, contrived by some as a “spoiler,” is said to be aimed at confusing voters. At the same time, the national Justice Department seeks to block certification of the election, accuses certain actors of misleading a federal court, and has issued many subpoenas, including to the campaign of the leading contender, Mary Peltola, who denies all knowledge of the stratagem. Over this, a president demands legal and political punishment before any tribunal has rendered judgment. One begins, justly, to ask: who here obeys law, and who claims a license above it?
When I wrote that political power is “a right of making laws with penalties… only for the public good,” in the Second Treatise, I meant to bind rulers as much as subjects. Power is held on trust, and that trust is limited to preserving each person’s property in the broad sense—his life, liberty, and estate. In elections, the public good lies first in securing a free and intelligent choice by those who are to live under the laws. If a contrivance with duplicate names is used to darken understanding, not to enlighten it, then it offends that trust, even if some court has found no statute against it; for the law of nature itself requires that no one do to another what he would not have done to himself in like case.
Yet it is a distinct question whether such conduct, though unworthy, is a proper object of punishment by the magistrate. Your own reports say that ballot‑stacking may be “a nasty, dirty trick” with “bad motives,” but “according to [the] Alaska Supreme Court… it is not illegal.” If the legislature, which alone has authority to declare beforehand what shall be crime, has not forbidden this artifice, then for the executive, under colour of general phrases, to treat it after the fact as criminal, comes very near to ruling by arbitrary discretion. The people are then left not under known standing laws, but under the fluctuating will of those who prosecute.
Here the duties of understanding are as strict as those of justice. In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding I argued that assent ought always to be proportioned to the evidence, and that to believe beyond one’s proofs is not a mark of virtue but of credulity. The Justice Department, if it charges that a campaign misled a federal court, must therefore show, in plain particulars, what was said, what was false, and how it touched a point of law material to the court’s judgment. A bare assertion in a filing, however vehement, is not yet proof. Nor is a denial by the accused yet an acquittal. Where the evidence has not been publicly tested, the rest of us do well to suspend our judgment.
There is also the danger, very old though it now wears new garments, that the same power which has an interest in the outcome will pretend to be an impartial judge of all that bears upon it. When a president calls for legal and political ruin of a named candidate whilst investigations are still in train, he does in effect invite prosecutors and citizens to take his private opinion as public rule. When the national executive seeks to halt the certification of an election his own administration helped oversee, he is perilously close to being judge in his own case. No free people can safely allow either prince or minister to hold that double character unexamined.
None of this clears the actors who may have contrived the spoiler candidate, if they did so with set purpose to deceive their neighbours. Manipulating the ballot to snare the inattentive is, in moral truth, a kind of theft; it steals the effective force of a man’s vote by banking on his confusion. Even if no positive law in Alaska has yet marked this as offence, the practice is contrary to that fair dealing which natural reason prescribes between equal men. A wise legislative would, in due time and with sober debate, clarify its election laws so that each citizen may know beforehand what artifices are forbidden, and so that the magistrate need not stretch old words to catch new tricks.
But for the present controversy, the chief demand is for daylight and restraint. Let the prosecutors show their case in full, subject to the ordinary rules; let the accused answer; let courts declare plainly what the law, as written, does and does not condemn. Let neither popular fury nor executive impatience hurry this process, nor let partisan advantage masquerade as justice. If, over time, a long train of abuses should appear—elections twisted by artifice, prosecutions steered by faction, certifications withheld to serve the rulers’ friends—then a people would be entitled to judge that the trust had been broken, and to seek redress in the ways still left to them. For now they must insist, steadily, that those who govern remember they are but ministers of a law above them, not masters of the people’s choice.
From the works cited
- Second Treatise of Government — Political power defined narrowly as the right to make laws, with penalties, only for the public good — anything beyond that definition must justify itself or stand condemned.
- Second Treatise of Government — The law of nature as analytic baseline: perfect freedom and equality under the law of nature, so that government must be shown to improve on that baseline for everyone who leaves it.
- An Essay Concerning Human Understanding — Assent must be proportioned to the evidence; believing beyond one's proofs is a failure of duty, not a mark of faith.
